2021/02/18 by Gourav Saha, Saha, Gourav, Alhussein A. Abouzeid +1
Business, Management and Accounting · Economics, Econometrics and Finance · Engineering · #Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) #Digital Platforms and Economics #FOS: Computer and information sciences #ICT Impact and Policies #Merger and Competition Analysis
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2102.09162
openalex publication_date 2021/02/18 · openalex created_date 2022/07/25 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
We consider the problem of partitioning a spectrum band into M channels of\nequal bandwidth, and then further assigning these M channels into P licensed\nchannels and M-P unlicensed channels. Licensed channels can be accessed both\nfor licensed and opportunistic use following a tiered structure which has a\nhigher priority for licensed use. Unlicensed channels can be accessed only for\nopportunistic use. We address the following question in this paper. Given a\nmarket setup, what values of M and P maximize the net spectrum utilization of\nthe spectrum band? While this problem is of fundamental nature, it is highly\nrelevant practically, e.g., in the context of partitioning the recently\nproposed Citizens Broadband Radio Service band. If M is too high or too low, it\nmay decrease spectrum utilization due to limited channel capacity or due to\nwastage of channel capacity, respectively. If P is too high (low), it will not\nincentivize the wireless operators who are primarily interested in unlicensed\nchannels (licensed channels) to join the market. These tradeoffs are captured\nin our optimization problem which manifests itself as a two-stage Stackelberg\ngame. We design an algorithm to solve the Stackelberg game and hence find the\noptimal M and P. The algorithm design also involves an efficient Monte Carlo\nintegrator to evaluate the expected value of the involved random variables like\nspectrum utilization and operators' revenue. We also benchmark our algorithms\nusing numerical simulations.\n