2024/01/22 by Piotr Faliszewski, Martin Lackner, Faliszewski, Piotr +5 · 1 citation
Computer Science · Economics, Econometrics and Finance · Mathematics · #Advanced Algebra and Logic #Anti-plurality voting #Approval voting #Artificial intelligence #Axiom #Cardinal voting systems #Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) #Computer science #Data mining #Econometrics #FOS: Computer and information sciences #Game Theory and Voting Systems #Image (mathematics) #Independence (probability theory) #Law #Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge #Mathematical economics #Mathematics #Measure (data warehouse) #Political science #Similarity (geometry) #Statistics #Voting
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2401.11870
published in arXiv (Cornell University) (Cornell University)
openalex publication_date 2024/01/22 · openalex created_date 2024/01/24 · openalex updated_date 2026/08/04
In this paper, we experimentally compare major approval-based multiwinner voting rules. To this end, we define a measure of similarity between two equal-sized committees subject to a given election. Using synthetic elections coming from several distributions, we analyze how similar are the committees provided by prominent voting rules. Our results can be visualized as ``maps of voting rules'', which provide a counterpoint to a purely axiomatic classification of voting rules. The strength of our proposed method is its independence from preimposed classifications (such as the satisfaction of concrete axioms), and that it indeed offers a much finer distinction than the current state of axiomatic analysis.