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No Ascending Auction can find Equilibrium for SubModular valuations

2023/12/01 by Oren Ben-Zwi, Ben-Zwi, Oren, Ilan Newman +1
Decision Sciences · Economics, Econometrics and Finance · Mathematics · #Auction Theory and Applications #Auction algorithm #Auction theory #Common value auction #Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) #Economic theories and models #Economics #FOS: Computer and information sciences #FOS: Economics and business #Game Theory and Applications #Mathematical economics #Mathematical optimization #Mathematics #Microeconomics #Revenue equivalence #Submodular set function #Theoretical Economics (econ.TH) #Vickrey–Clarke–Groves auction #Walrasian auction

paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2312.00522

openalex publication_date 2023/12/01 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28

Abstract

We show that no efficient ascending auction can guarantee to find even a minimal envy-free price vector if all valuations are submodular, assuming a basic complexity theory's assumption.

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