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Shortlisting Rules and Incentives in an End-to-End Model for\n Participatory Budgeting

2020/10/20 by Simon Rey, Rey, Simon, Ulle Endriss +3
Economics, Econometrics and Finance · #Game Theory and Voting Systems

paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2010.10309

Abstract

We introduce an end-to-end model of participatory budgeting grounded in\nsocial choice theory. This model accounts for both the first stage, in which\nparticipants propose projects to be shortlisted, and the second stage, in which\nthey vote on which of the shortlisted projects should be funded. We introduce\nseveral shortlisting rules for the first stage and we analyse them in both\nnormative and algorithmic terms. Our main focus is on the incentives of\nparticipants to engage in strategic behaviour, especially in the first stage,\nin which they need to reason about how their proposals will impact the range of\nstrategies available to everyone in the second stage.\n

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