2022/05/29 by Bulteau, Laurent, Chen, Jiehua
#Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) #FOS: Computer and information sciences #Multiagent Systems (cs.MA)
paper · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2205.14687
A preference profile with m alternatives and n voters is 2-dimensional Euclidean if both the alternatives and the voters can be placed into a 2-dimensional space such that for each pair of alternatives, every voter prefers the one which has a shorter Euclidean distance to the voter. We study how 2-dimensional Euclidean preference profiles depend on the values m and n. We find that any profile with at most two voters or at most three alternatives is 2-dimensional Euclidean while for three voters, we can show this property for up to seven alternatives. The results are tight in terms of Bogomolnaia and Laslier [2, Proposition 15(1)].