2019/12/02 by Dieter Stiers, Ruth Dassonneville, Michael S. Lewis‐Beck · 1 citation
Social Sciences · Economics, Econometrics and Finance · #Electoral Systems and Political Participation #Fiscal Policies and Political Economy #Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth
paper · doi:10.1111/1475-6765.12360
Abstract Although the theory of retrospective voting receives wide support in the literature on voting behaviour, less agreement exists on voters’ time horizon when assessing the government's performance – that is, whether voters are myopic . Previous studies on voter myopia tend to focus on aggregate‐level measures of the economy, or use an experimental approach. Using panel data, this article offers the first investigation into voter myopia that uses individual‐level evaluations of government performance in a representative survey at several points during the electoral cycle. The study focuses on The Netherlands, but it also provide tests of the generalisability and robustness of the findings, and a replication in the American context. The results indicate that voter satisfaction early in the government's term adds to explaining incumbent voting. Thus, rather than the myopic voter, evidence is found of the abiding voter – steady at her or his post, evaluating government performance over a long length of time.