2019/10/25 by Dengji Zhao, Zhao, Dengji, Yiqing Huang +5
Decision Sciences · Economics, Econometrics and Finance · #Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI) #Auction Theory and Applications #Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) #FOS: Computer and information sciences #Game Theory and Applications #Game Theory and Voting Systems
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1910.11737
openalex publication_date 2019/10/25 · openalex created_date 2022/07/28 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
The research on coalitional games has focused on how to share the reward\namong a coalition such that players are incentivised to collaborate together.\nIt assumes that the (deterministic or stochastic) characteristic function is\nknown in advance. This paper studies a new setting (a task allocation problem)\nwhere the characteristic function is not known and it is controlled by some\nprivate information from the players. Hence, the challenge here is twofold: (i)\nincentivize players to reveal their private information truthfully, (ii)\nincentivize them to collaborate together. We show that existing reward\ndistribution mechanisms or auctions cannot solve the challenge. Hence, we\npropose the very first mechanism for the problem from the perspective of both\nmechanism design and coalitional games.\n