2021/08/29 by Rui Luo, Luo, Rui, Buddhika Nettasinghe +3 · 2 citations
Decision Sciences · Physics and Astronomy · #Complex Network Analysis Techniques #FOS: Computer and information sciences #Game Theory and Applications #Opinion Dynamics and Social Influence #Social and Information Networks (cs.SI)
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2108.12741
openalex publication_date 2021/08/29 · openalex created_date 2022/07/26 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
This paper studies controlling segregation in social networks via exogenous incentives. We construct an edge formation game on a directed graph. A user (node) chooses the probability with which it forms an inter- or intra- community edge based on a utility function that reflects the tradeoff between homophily (preference to connect with individuals that belong to the same group) and the preference to obtain an exogenous incentive. Decisions made by the users to connect with each other determine the evolution of the social network. We explore an algorithmic recommendation mechanism where the exogenous incentive in the utility function is based on weak ties which incentivizes users to connect across communities and mitigates the segregation. This setting leads to a submodular game with a unique Nash equilibrium. In numerical simulations, we explore how the proposed model can be useful in controlling segregation and echo chambers in social networks under various settings.