2025/11/17 by Min Heo, Samuel C. Rickless
Arts and Humanities · Psychology · #Historical Philosophy and Science #Philosophy and Theoretical Science #Theology and Philosophy of Evil
paper · doi:10.25894/jmp.2607
As Margaret Wilson famously argued, Leibniz appears committed to two mutually inconsistent propositions: (1) I am a particular substance, and (2) It is metaphysically possible that I continue to exist independently of this particular substance. Three solutions have been offered to this conundrum on Leibniz’s behalf: that (1) and (2) are compatible because I am only contingently identical with this particular substance; that Leibniz rejects (1); and that Leibniz rejects (2). In this essay, we explain why Leibniz does not accept any of these solutions, and we then offer two additional textually supported ways for Leibniz to avoid inconsistency. On the 'modal' solution, Leibniz identifies the fact that makes (2) true as a fact about my counterpart and a counterpart of the substance with which I am identical, and hence (1) and (2) can both be true together. On the 'ambiguity' solution, Leibniz thinks that 'I' can be used to refer to a soul or to a person, and he endorses (1) only when 'I' refers to a soul and endorses (2) only when 'I' refers to a person. On either the modal solution or the ambiguity solution, Leibniz avoids inconsistency and Wilson’s conundrum is solved.