2017/05/19 by Giovanni Rigazzi, Andrea Tassi, Rigazzi, Giovanni +7
Computer Science · Engineering · #Advanced Authentication Protocols Security #Caching and Content Delivery #Cryptography and Security (cs.CR) #FOS: Computer and information sciences #Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks (VANETs)
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1705.06903
openalex publication_date 2017/05/19 · openalex created_date 2022/10/02 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
The successful deployment of safe and trustworthy Connected and Autonomous\nVehicles (CAVs) will highly depend on the ability to devise robust and\neffective security solutions to resist sophisticated cyber attacks and patch up\ncritical vulnerabilities. Pseudonym Public Key Infrastructure (PPKI) is a\npromising approach to secure vehicular networks as well as ensure data and\nlocation privacy, concealing the vehicles' real identities. Nevertheless,\npseudonym distribution and management affect PPKI scalability due to the\nsignificant number of digital certificates required by a single vehicle. In\nthis paper, we focus on the certificate revocation process and propose a\nversatile and low-complexity framework to facilitate the distribution of the\nCertificate Revocation Lists (CRL) issued by the Certification Authority (CA).\nCRL compression is achieved through optimized Bloom filters, which guarantee a\nconsiderable overhead reduction with a configurable rate of false positives.\nOur results show that the distribution of compressed CRLs can significantly\nenhance the system scalability without increasing the complexity of the\nrevocation process.\n