2024/08/30 by Isaac Richter, Jie Zhou, Richter, Isaac +3 · 1 citation
Computer Science · #Cryptographic Implementations and Security #Cryptography and Security (cs.CR) #FOS: Computer and information sciences #Internet Traffic Analysis and Secure E-voting #Security and Verification in Computing
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2408.17248
openalex publication_date 2024/08/30 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
Modern microcontroller software is often written in C/C++ and suffers from control-flow hijacking vulnerabilities. Previous mitigations suffer from high performance and memory overheads and require either the presence of memory protection hardware or sophisticated program analysis in the compiler. This paper presents DeTRAP (Debug Trigger Return Address Protection). DeTRAP utilizes a full implementation of the RISC-V debug hardware specification to provide a write-protected shadow stack for return addresses. Unlike previous work, DeTRAP requires no memory protection hardware and only minor changes to the compiler toolchain. We tested DeTRAP on an FPGA running a 32-bit RISC-V microcontroller core and found average execution time overheads to be between 0.5% and 1.9% on evaluated benchmark suites with code size overheads averaging 7.9% or less.