From Tarski to Gödel. Or, how to derive the Second Incompleteness Theorem from the Undefinability of Truth without Self-reference

2018/03/11 by Visser, Albert
#03F25 #03F30 #03F40 #FOS: Mathematics #Logic (math.LO)

paper · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1803.03937

Abstract

In this paper, we provide a fairly general self-reference-free proof of the Second Incompleteness Theorem from Tarski's Theorem of the Undefinability of Truth.

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