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Equilibrium Refinement through Negotiation in Binary Voting

2014/04/22 by Umberto Grandi, Davide Grossi, Grandi, Umberto +3
Computer Science · Decision Sciences · Economics, Econometrics and Finance · Mathematics · #Auction Theory and Applications #Binary number #Bullet voting #Cardinal voting systems #Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) #Computer science #Economics #FOS: Computer and information sciences #Game Theory and Applications #Game Theory and Voting Systems #Game theory #Law #Mathematical economics #Mathematics #Microeconomics #Multiagent Systems (cs.MA) #Negotiation #Political science #Voting #cs.GT #cs.MA

paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1404.5433

openalex publication_date 2014/04/22 · arxiv created 2017/01/09 · arxiv updated 2017/01/10 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28

Abstract

We study voting games on binary issues, where voters hold an objective over the outcome of the collective decision and are allowed, before the vote takes place, to negotiate their voting strategy with the other participants. We analyse the voters' rational behaviour in the resulting two-phase game, showing under what conditions undesirable equilibria can be removed and desirable ones sustained as a consequence of the pre-vote phase.

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