2010/09/25 by Samir M. Perlaza, S. M. Perlaza, Hamidou Tembiné +8
Computer Science · Decision Sciences · Mathematics · #Advanced Bandit Algorithms Research #Cognitive Radio Networks and Spectrum Sensing #Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) #FOS: Computer and information sciences #Game Theory and Applications #Information Theory (cs.IT) #cs.GT #cs.IT #math.IT
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1009.5026
In proc. of the IEEE Latin-American Conference on Communications (LATINCOM), Bogota, Colombia, September, 2010
arxiv created 2010/09/25 · openalex publication_date 2010/09/25 · arxiv updated 2010/09/28 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
Considering the interaction through mutual interference of the different radio devices, the channel selection (CS) problem in decentralized parallel multiple access channels can be modeled by strategic-form games. Here, we show that the CS problem is a potential game (PG) and thus the fictitious play (FP) converges to a Nash equilibrium (NE) either in pure or mixed strategies. Using a 2-player 2-channel game, it is shown that convergence in mixed strategies might lead to cycles of action profiles which lead to individual spectral efficiencies (SE) which are worse than the SE at the worst NE in mixed and pure strategies. Finally, exploiting the fact that the CS problem is a PG and an aggregation game, we present a method to implement FP with local information and minimum feedback.