2012/02/05 by Elchanan Mossel, Omer Tamuz, Mossel, Elchanan +1
Computer Science · Decision Sciences · Social Sciences · #Auction Theory and Applications #Blockchain Technology Applications and Security #Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) #Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies #FOS: Computer and information sciences #Game Theory and Applications
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1202.0969
openalex publication_date 2012/02/05 · openalex created_date 2025/10/27 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
We consider an auction of identical digital goods to customers whose\nvaluations are drawn independently from known distributions. Myerson's classic\nresult identifies the truthful mechanism that maximizes the seller's expected\nprofit.\n Under the assumption that in small groups customers can learn each others'\nvaluations, we show how Myerson's result can be improved to yield a higher\npayoff to the seller using a mechanism that offers groups of customers to buy\nbundles of items.\n