2007/12/01 by Lionel Naccache, Stanislas Dehaene
Neuroscience · Psychology · #Action Observation and Synchronization #Neural and Behavioral Psychology Studies #Neural dynamics and brain function
paper · doi:10.1017/s0140525x07002993
openalex publication_date 2007/12/01 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/30
Abstract Can we ever experimentally disentangle phenomenal consciousness from the cognitive accessibility inherent to conscious reports? In this commentary, we suggest that (1) Block's notion of phenomenal consciousness remains intractably entangled with the need to obtain subjective reports about it; and (2) many experimental paradigms suggest that the intuitive notion of a rich but non-reportable phenomenal world is, to a large extent illusory – in a sense that requires clarification.