Reportability and illusions of phenomenality in the light of the global neuronal workspace model

2007/12/01 by Lionel Naccache, Stanislas Dehaene · 35 citations
Mathematics · Neuroscience · Psychology · #Action Observation and Synchronization #Artificial intelligence #Block (permutation group theory) #Cognition #Cognitive psychology #Cognitive science #Computer science #Consciousness #Epistemology #Illusion #Mathematics #Neural and Behavioral Psychology Studies #Neural dynamics and brain function #Neuroscience #Philosophy #Psychology #Workspace

paper · doi:10.1017/s0140525x07002993

published in Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30(5-6), 518-520 (Cambridge University Press)

openalex publication_date 2007/12/01 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/30

Abstract

Abstract Can we ever experimentally disentangle phenomenal consciousness from the cognitive accessibility inherent to conscious reports? In this commentary, we suggest that (1) Block's notion of phenomenal consciousness remains intractably entangled with the need to obtain subjective reports about it; and (2) many experimental paradigms suggest that the intuitive notion of a rich but non-reportable phenomenal world is, to a large extent illusory – in a sense that requires clarification.

Citations

• Towards a cognitive neuroscience of consciousness: basic evidence and a workspace framework

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