1978/08/01 by Bruce E. Cain · 321 citations
Business, Management and Accounting · Economics, Econometrics and Finance · Social Sciences · #Aggregate (composite) #Aggregate data #Computer science #Disapproval voting #Economics #Electoral Systems and Political Participation #Game Theory and Voting Systems #Group voting ticket #Law #Margin (machine learning) #Microeconomics #Political Influence and Corporate Strategies #Political economy #Political science #Politics #Positive economics #Preference #Set (abstract data type) #Split-ticket voting #Test (biology) #Voting #Voting behavior
paper · doi:10.2307/2110465
published in American Journal of Political Science 22(3), 639 (Wiley)
openalex publication_date 1978/08/01 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
Formal political theory has raised serious doubts about the existence of strategic voting, and this in turn has challenged the prevailing wisdom in comparative politics about phenomena like "squeezing" and the effect of the "wasted vote." This paper attempts to set out the conditions for strategic voting and to test for it using data from the 1970 British General election. The results from both an aggregate and a survey analysis indicate that individuals are more likely to vote for their second preference when they perceive that their first choice has little chance of winning. This effect is particularly strong when the next best party is at a margin of under five percent.