2018/10/04 by Fady Copty, Francisco Hernandez, Copty, Fady +6 · 1 voice
Computer Science · #Advanced Malware Detection Techniques #Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) and Hardware Security #Security and Verification in Computing #cs.CR
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1810.02090
arxiv published 2018/10/04 · arxiv updated 2018/10/11
Cybercriminals use Return Oriented Programming techniques to attack systems and IoT devices. While defenses have been developed, not all of them are applicable to constrained devices. We present Shakedown, which is a compile-time randomizing build tool which creates several versions of the binary, each with a distinct memory layout. An attack developed against one device will not work on another device which has a different memory layout. We tested Shakedown on an industrial IoT device and shown that its normal functionality remained intact while an exploit was blocked.