2025/01/17 by William M Myers, William M. Myers, Davia C Downey · 1 citation
Economics, Econometrics and Finance · Social Sciences · #American Constitutional Law and Politics #Disadvantage #Federal court #Federal law #Federal state #Federalism #Institution #Judicial and Constitutional Studies #Law #Legal and Constitutional Studies #Legislation #New Federalism #Political science #Politics #Power (physics) #Public administration #State (computer science) #Supreme court
paper · doi:10.1093/publius/pjaf002
published in Publius The Journal of Federalism (Oxford University Press)
openalex publication_date 2025/01/17 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/29
Abstract Municipal governments do not have constitutional recognition and risk being viewed as an afterthought by federalism scholars despite being key partners in facilitating state and federal policymaking as well as managing local affairs. How municipal governments exercise power and their role in the federal system has been litigated throughout the nation's history and has permitted the Supreme Court to issue rulings with implications for governmental power, private rights, and the functioning of the nation's federal framework and intergovernmental organization. To explore how the Court’s decisions shaped the federal framework, we utilize litigation involving municipal governments at the Supreme Court to assess theories of dual and cooperative federalism from the Founding through 2021. The lack of constitutional recognition places municipalities at a disadvantage against litigation opponents with entrenched powers (federal and state governments) or rights (businesses, organizations, and individuals). Our findings suggest that the Court’s treatment of municipal governments is much more complex than is normally assumed and is consistent with an institution focused on monitoring the federal system and adjusting accordingly.