2016/02/05 by Haris Aziz, Aziz, Haris
Decision Sciences · Economics, Econometrics and Finance · #68Q15 #91A12 #Auction Theory and Applications #Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) #Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics #F.2 #FOS: Computer and information sciences #Game Theory and Voting Systems #J.4
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1602.02174
openalex publication_date 2016/02/05 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
When aggregating preferences of agents via voting, two desirable goals are to identify outcomes that are Pareto optimal and to incentivize agents to participate in the voting process. We consider participation notions as formalized by Brandl, Brandt, and Hofbauer (2015) and study how far efficiency and participation are achievable by randomized social choice functions in particular when agents' preferences are downward lexicographic (DL) or satisfy stochastic dominance (SD). Our results include the followings ones: we prove formal relations between the participation notions with respect to SD and DL and we show that the maximal recursive rule satisfies very strong participation with respect to both SD and DL.