2023/08/16 by Justin Mendelow
Psychology · Arts and Humanities · #Philosophy and Theoretical Science #Theology and Philosophy of Evil #Philosophical Ethics and Theory
paper · pdf · doi:10.1080/00048402.2023.2243622
Russellian monists argue that non-structural properties, or a combination of structural and non-structural properties, necessitate phenomenal properties. Different Russellian monists offer varying accounts of the structural/non-structural distinction, leading to divergent forms of Russellian monism. In this paper, I criticise Derk Pereboom’s characterisation of the structural/non-structural distinction proposed in his Consciousness and the Prospects of Physicalism and further work. I argue that from Pereboom’s characterisation of structural and non-structural properties, one can formulate general metaphysical principles concerning what structural and non-structural properties necessitate. These principles undermine the claim that non-structural properties—either alone or in combination with structural properties—necessitate phenomenal properties. Moreover, these principles are not affected by our supposed inability to conceive of non-structural properties in a manner conducive to the success of conceivability arguments.