2026/07/21 by Mi-yeon Hur
paper · doi:10.1177/00471178261468241
When Iran and the P5+1 group of world powers agreed on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), many believed that the nuclear deal could be concluded mainly due to U.S. President Barack Obama’s determination and persistent overtures towards Tehran. However, such a point of view overlooks the fact that Obama’s approach towards Iran was not always conciliatory. This article begins with the assumption that Obama’s stance on Iran changed due to the array of challenges and opportunities posed by the Middle East. Employing operational code analysis, this study finds that Obama’s foreign policy learning towards Iran was intrinsically related to changes in his view of the deteriorating situation in the Middle East rather than Iran’s evolving domestic political environment. It therefore argues that the Iran nuclear deal was pursued as a strategy to prevent further destabilization of the Middle East, without a fundamental change in Obama’s perception of Iran.