1985/10/01 by Robert Jervis · 204 citations
Psychology · Social Sciences · #Balance (ability) #Business #Computer science #Computer security #Dilemma #Economic system #Economics #Global Peace and Security Dynamics #Incentive #International Relations and Foreign Policy #International security #Law #Law and economics #Microeconomics #Peacebuilding and International Security #Political economy #Political science #Politics #Power (physics) #Psychology #Security dilemma #Sovereign state #Sovereignty #State (computer science)
paper · doi:10.2307/2010351
published in World Politics 38(1), 58-79 (Cambridge University Press)
openalex publication_date 1985/10/01 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
International anarchy and the security dilemma make cooperation among sovereign states difficult. Transformations of balance-of-power systems into concerts tend to occur after large antihegemonic wars. Such wars undermine the assumptions supporting a balance-ofpower system and alter the actors' payoffs in ways that encourage cooperation. The logic developed in “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma” holds: largely because of the increased costs that will be incurred if the grand coalition breaks up, states have greater incentives to cooperate with each other, fewer reasons to fear the consequences of others' defections, and fewer reasons to defect themselves. Cooperation is further facilitated by mechanisms that increase each state's ability to see what others are doing, and to gain “timely warning” of the possibility that the others will defect.