2024/11/14 by Andrew Koh, Koh, Andrew, Sivakorn Sanguanmoo +3
Decision Sciences · Social Sciences · #Auction Theory and Applications #Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies #FOS: Computer and information sciences #FOS: Economics and business #Game Theory and Applications #Multiagent Systems (cs.MA) #Theoretical Economics (econ.TH)
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2411.09191
openalex publication_date 2024/11/14 · openalex created_date 2024/11/17 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
We analyze how dynamic information should be provided to uniquely implement the largest equilibrium in binary-action coordination games. The designer offers an informational put: she stays silent if players choose her preferred action, but injects asymmetric and inconclusive public information if they lose faith. There is (i) no multiplicity gap: the largest (partially) implementable equilibrium can be implemented uniquely; and (ii) no commitment gap: the policy is sequentially optimal. Our results have sharp implications for the design of policy in coordination environments.